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Abstract  
To assess the effectiveness of a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), we 
distinguish between its contribution to the quality of the ultimate policy choice 
(usefulness, applicability), the procedural quality of the planning process 
(transparency, timeliness) and the quality of the stakeholder participation in the 
planning process (openness, equity, dialogue). In the context of two case studies 
involving Dutch planning practice, we argue that when and how an SEA is applied is 
crucial to understanding its effectiveness and show that the effectiveness of an SEA 
depends upon its alignment with and embedment within the planning process.  
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1. Introduction 
Dutch society can be seen as a typically postmaterialist society (Inglehart, 1990) in 
which various values are well organized and numerous stakeholders try to influence 
spatial planning. Within this society, planning is often both highly controversial and 
time-consuming. Each spatial function has its advocates who are well-equipped to 
influence planning decisions and to defend their stake. Despite the fact that the Dutch 
planning culture is strongly consensus-oriented and stakeholders get many 
opportunities to participate; actors who feel threatened do not hesitate to go to court to 
defend their interests, especially in the later stages of decision-making. This tendency 
has the effect of rendering the complex planning processes both unpredictable and 
time-consuming.  
In this context, the knowledge production process often becomes as controversial as 
the planning process itself. Because impact assessments, cost-benefit analyses and 
other research exercises heavily influence the choices that made, stakeholders try very 
hard to influence the research trajectory. They actively question the outcomes of 
research efforts – especially when the findings are not in line with their own 
definitions of the problem (Van Buuren & Edelenbos, 2004; Collingridge & Reeve, 
1986). Knowledge processes are thus an inherent part of the political struggle 
surrounding planning decisions. The effectiveness and value of the knowledge 
production process not only depends on its contribution to the rationalization of 
political choice. Because this choice is always value-laden, it also depends heavily on 
its contribution toward establishing inclusiveness and democracy within the planning 
process (Van Buuren, 2009; Cashmore, 2006).  
The same can be said of Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs). SEA‟s are 
predefined procedures that structure the process of knowledge production within a 
spatial planning endeavor. Therivel and Partidario (1992) define an SEA as: “the 
formalised, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the environmental 
effects of a policy, plan or programme and its alternatives, including the preparation 
of a written report on the findings of that evaluation, and the use of these findings in 
publicly accountable decision-making”. SEAs are meant to ensure that policy options 
that have significant environmental impacts are weighed dully and deliberately. Often, 
the effectiveness of an SEA is framed in terms of its contribution to the utilization of 
information related to the environmental consequences of a proposed project. An 
effective SEA is used in decision-making, and ultimately leads to the selection of the 
most environmental-friendly option and/or the adoption of necessary mitigation 
measures if the most environmentally friendly option is not selected. However, the 
effectiveness of an SEA depends not only upon the use of the knowledge to enables 
rational and sustainable policy choices, but also upon its contribution to a 
collaborative dialogue.  
In this article, we discuss the various functions an SEA can serve in order to further 
the effectiveness of a complex and controversial planning processes. In order to 
establish several key SEA effectiveness criteria, it is first necessary to understand the 
fundamental characteristics and requirements of a planning process that will result in 
legitimate and effectual outcomes (section 2 and 3).  Features of an effective SEA are 
discerned in this paper in the context of two case studies (sections 5 and 6). In section 
7, we investigate the conditions that allow for effective SEAs that contribute distinctly 
to the quality of the planning process. Our findings are discussed in the final section. 
 
2. Characteristics of an effective SEA 
What makes an SEA effective? The literature is rich with attempts to answer this 
question. Cashmore et al (2008) defined four effectiveness criterions that determine 
the transformative potentialities of environmental assessments: learning outcomes 
(both social and technical); governance outcomes (e.g. stakeholder participation, 
network development); development outcomes (design choices; consent decisions) 
and attitudinal and value changes.  
In general, an SEA is meant to safeguard environmental interests and to ensure that 
they are given serious consideration in any plans and programs. SEAs were initiated 
also to further the likelihood that more sustainable policy options are developed and 
selected (e.g. European Union Directive on Environmental Assessment of Plans and 
Programs; see Wallington et al 2007). As such, the effectiveness of an SEA can be 
seen as its contribution to the selection of the most sustainable, environmental-
friendly planning option. Impact assessments contribute to the body of serviceable 
knowledge that is considered in making the choice between multiple policy options 
(Jasanoff, 1990). Apart from adding to available information, they may further 
contribute by framing the argument and longer-term choices.  
Despite these obvious benefits, the impact of the SEA on the content of a policy 
choice is often unclear, as choices tend to evolve over time and the planning process 
is influenced by multiple other sources of information as well as views of 
stakeholders. Because the process is fluid and influenced by multiple factors it is often 
impossible to pinpoint the exact impact of SEA on the final decision. In general then, 
impact assessments can be said to contribute to the body of knowledge that is 
considered in deciding between policy options. They may also augment certain 
perspectives, legitimize specific choices and provide a rationale for specific spatial 
functions that are preferred by the authorities.  
However, the outcomes of an impact assessment can be highly controversial because 
they affect how far stakeholders can realize their own ambitions. Stakeholders have 
their own views of problems, their own values and normative frames, and they are 
often capable of mobilizing experts to counter and discredit data collected by planners 
and policy-makers. Frequently, these controversies result in legal action in which the 
stakeholders try to convince the court that the impact of spatial development plans 
have not be sufficiently considered.  
It is for this reason that not only the content of the SEA is relevant to the planning 
processes, but also the process of executing an SEA (Pischke & Cashmore, 2006). 
The impact assessment can both magnify the disputes between stakeholders, and 
minimize it by aiding in the establishment of common ground. Depending on how the 
SEA is organized, it can certainly contribute to the quality of the collaborative 
process, and help ensure that stakeholders work together to realize a decision in a 
consensual manner. By carefully intertwining the process of stakeholder participation 
and knowledge production, a process of joint fact-finding can be realized in which 
there occurs a reflexive dialogue and  frame reflection between stakeholders with 
highly diverging perceptions. To fulfill this function, the SEA has to be independent, 
credible and univocal (Sarewitz, 2004; Twaalfhoven, 1999; Clark & Majone, 1985) 
and its production process has to be inclusive, democratic and transparent (Van 
Buuren & Nooteboom, 2009; Woodhouse & Nieusma, 2001; Guston, 2004). 
Along with its contributions to the quality of the collaborative process and the 
ultimate policy choice, an SEA can also contribute to the quality of the decision-
making procedure. Planning processes surrounding highly controversial public 
investments are exceptionally difficult to organize and manage. For this and other 
reasons, the course of planning can be erratic and unpredictable, and the planners 
often run out of time and budget (Teisman, 2008). Transparent and unambiguous 
procedures which structure the decision-making process can contribute to their overall 
quality. The following are the formal steps involved in establishing an SEA within the 
Dutch planning process: 
1) Public announcement of the start of the procedure; 
2) Consultation with administrative bodies likely to be involved in the 
implementation of the plan about the scope and details of the environmental 
statement; 
3) Writing of the environmental statement (termed „plan-Environmental Impact 
Assessment‟); 
4) Public display of the environmental statement and draft plan to elicit public 
feedback and consultation of the Netherlands Commission on the EIA; 
5) Writing of the final plan based on established environmental impacts and 
consultations; 
6) Publication of the final plan; 
7) Evaluation of the impacts of the project after implementation (Ministry of 
VROM, 2006). 
All in all, an SEA adds to the decision making process only the requirement that a 
formal statement be made about the environmental impact of a course of action, and 
that the decision to go ahead with a planning project is made after fully considering 
these impacts. Paradoxically however, this requirement tends to render the authorities 
more vulnerable to criticism that environmental information is omitted or 
undervalued, and can easily add to the “war of knowledge” which is often fought out 
in court. Nonetheless, this very risk may instead be viewed as an opportunity to 
consider more carefully how the detailed planning process is structured within the 
prevailing legal framework. Those responsible for doing the SEA may see it as their 
responsibility to work with the planners so that more key parties agree with the 
process and final proposal. As such, the SEA can facilitate an ordered, transparent, 
and timely decision-making process, in which the same questions do not need to be 
answered again and again and political support does emerge for a well-considered and 
widely supported final proposal. 
 
3. Criteria for effectiveness of SEA 
Summarizing the previous section, we formulate three criteria with which we evaluate 
the effectiveness of an SEA that is established within the controversial planning 
processes: 
1. The SEA enables decision-making based upon authoritative and undisputed 
information on the environmental consequences of each alternative choice 
(content); 
2. The SEA contributes to the inclusiveness of the collaborative dialogue, and 
thus to the realization of support and legitimacy by achieving consensus and 
frame-reflection (process); 
3. As a procedural device, the SEA, contributes to the timeliness, transparency, 
and quality of the overall decision-making process (procedure).   
If these conditions are met, the SEA would likely have a desired effect on the 
outcomes of the planning processes. With this interpretation of effectiveness, we 
move beyond the technical, rational interpretation of the impact of SEAs and broaden 
our understanding of the elements which determine the contribution of SEA to the 
effectiveness, legitimacy, and overall quality of the decision-making process 
(Partidario, 2000). We focus on the direct impact of an SEA on the quality of the 
decision-making process with regard to the quality of its content and its stakeholder 
participation and its procedural quality.  
Of course, the link between SEA quality and the quality of decision-making is not 
straightforward. Other factors also influence the quality of decision-making with 
regard to content, process and procedure.  
Nonetheless, the above criteria can be said to bring together elements related to 
various models of science and impact assessment (Cashmore, 2006; Cashmore et al. 
2004; 2007). Departing from a critical realist perspective, they integrate a more 
analytical approach toward the content of the SEA (Thérivel & Minas, 2002) and a 
participatory approach to the process of SEA creation and decision-making (see 
Kornov & Thissen, 2000), and incorporate a more governance-oriented approach of 
decision-making in which procedures can be used to structure and to stage a complex 
decision-making process (see Cashmore et al. 2007). These elements interact 
continuously which each other and we have come to see them as indissoluble 
elements of any attempt to determine the effectiveness of an SEA. In the next section, 
we use two case studies involving SEAs as applied in the Dutch planning practice to 
shed light on the conditions under which SEA can realize these ambitions.  
 
4.  Methodology 
We compare two controversial Dutch planning processes which have received a great 
deal of political and public attention. The two cases were among the first few planning 
projects to be conducted in The Netherlands in accordance with the requirements of 
the SEA Directive. These projects preempted the wide-spread implementation of 
specific SEA requirements. However, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
had been applied countless times and can be seen as the main precedent to the current 
SEA. Since its introduction to The Netherlands in the 1970s, the EIA has been 
regarded as a supplementary procedure for decisions that require considerable 
assessment in order to secure an environmental permit or planning document. The 
EIA was supposed to facilitate a more environmentally-aware analysis of 
controversial decisions by explicitly developing alternatives to the proposed plan, and 
comparing their effects with those of the preferred alternative. Such assessments of 
the most environmentally friendly alternative were made compulsory, along with a 
formal review of the scoping document and environmental statement by the 
Netherlands Commission on Environmental Assessment. The SEA has taking over 
some of the functions of the EIA, and in doing so, has eased the process substantially. 
However, the number of projects expected to include an SEA annually is expected to 
increase significantly under the current legislation (see also Runhaar & Driessen, 
2007).  
Our first case concerns the Southern Sea Line. The Southern Sea is a large bay within 
The Netherlands that has given its name to a high-speed rail connection 
(Zuiderzeelijn, abbreviated: ZZL) that aims to connect Western Netherlands with the 
Northern region. The ZZL proposal came out of negotiations between the northern 
governments and the national government in the mid nineties in an effort to boost the 
lagging economy in the North by improving its connection to the economic centre. 
The national government reserved a significant budget for this high-speed railway 
connection and much preparatory work was done by the Ministry of Transport. 
However, at the last moment, a Parliamentary Enquiry Committee had significant 
doubts about both the railway necessity and added value of the ZZL. In face of serious 
time delays and cost overruns, the committee demanded a serious reassessment of the 
project before they would take a final decision. 
In the early 2000s the Cabinet assigned a committee to prepare a draft “structure 
vision” (a zoning plan), which was a formal strategic spatial assessment that included 
a Strategic Environmental Assessment, a Spatial Analysis and a Societal Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (SCBA). 
The second case concerns the redevelopment of the IJsseldelta Kampen, a large area 
near the river IJssel. Two spatial investments were proposed to enhance the river‟s 
retention capacity in times of high water flow. After a long process of design and 
dialogue, a SEA was commissioned because adjustments had to be made to regional 
and local planning documents.  
Looking at the two cases, it can be said that they are comparable in that both relate to 
very controversial planning efforts with multiple stakeholders from opposing 
domains. In addition, both dealt with large spatial projects (a railway infrastructure 
and a river bypass) and were organized with close interaction between authorities 
from local and regional levels.  
Nonetheless, these cases were chosen specifically for the fact that they differ on key 
factors related to the Dutch SEA practice. First, one project was furthered in relation 
to a single-issue (ZZL), while the other concerns multiple issues (IJsseldelta Zuid). 
Second, when considered together, the two projects reflect the application of SEA 
across a number of domains, namely infrastructure development, regional 
development, water management, and nature protection. Finally, in the case of the 
SSL, there was a national zoning document, while in the case of the IJsseldelta, two 
regional zoning documents had to be changed.  
The information used in our case studies is based on an extensive analysis of the 
project histories obtained by examining various policy and research documents and by 
conducting a series of interviews (about 12 per case) with planners, political 
authorities, stakeholders and SEA experts. In the case of the rail line, interviews were 
conducted as part of an official evaluation commissioned by the Ministry of 
Transport. During these interviews, much attention was paid to the planning process 
and the function of the SEA within this process and we asked respondents what they 
saw as the key contributions of SEA to creating authoritative content, inclusive 
collaborative dialogue and functional procedures. Although we acknowledge that the 
examination of just two cases provides a limited basis for more general conclusions, it 
is important to note that our cases were strategically selected to represent the varied 
Dutch SEA practice fairly accurately.  
 
5. Case studies 
5.1 Southern Sea Line 
The task of drafting a Structure Vision for the Southern Sea Line was given to a 
project bureau composed of officials from different ministries. Right from the start, all 
formal SEA steps were intertwined with the procedure used to develop the Structure 
Vision. This involved multidisciplinary teams of designers, researchers and planners 
working together to gradually develop the various building blocks that made up the 
Structure Vision. 
Because the SEA was initiated at the start of the planning process, it had the effect of 
increasing stakeholder expectations about the way environmental impacts would be 
assessed and integrated into the vision development process. This effect was triggered 
by the requirements that the SEA be publicly announced early in the planning process 
and that a separate report be produced specifically on environmental impacts. Because 
of their lack of familiarity with these requirements (which were not yet legally 
mandated), the project bureau decided to ask the Netherlands Commission on 
Environmental Assessment (NCEA) to advise on the scope of the SEA, as well as to 
evaluate the quality of the report that was later produced.  
A “Starting Document” was circulated among authorities and public, with open 
invitations for feedback on the desired scope of the SEA report. This included 
feedback on environmental impacts that had not been considered as well as alternative 
ways to reach the project‟s objectives. Dozens of meetings were organized within 
several provinces, and hundreds of politicians, officials, stakeholders and citizens 
attended. Based on the feedback received, a scoping document was prepared and 
circulated before the actual SEA was written. A social cost-benefit analysis and 
spatial analysis were also prepared along with the official SEA. Investors in the north 
were asked to participate in the financing of the project since the national 
contributions would not be sufficient to meet the project‟s needs. A market 
consultation effort was also organized to further this goal.  
These parallel processes were run by both public and private consultancies, and the 
project bureau coordinated the alternatives and impacts to be assessed. Several 
alternative technologies and routes for the rail line were developed, assessed, and 
compared. SEA specialists met with municipalities along all of the railway‟s routes. A 
nearly final SEA and draft structure vision were circulated among stakeholders, and 
the results were taken into consideration (Projectorganisatie Zuiderzeelijn 2005a; 
2005b). The SEA was ready a year after the start of the project bureau, and it was 
submitted to Cabinet (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006). However, in April 
2006, the Cabinet decided on an alternative course of action called the “transition 
alternative” to meet the original purpose of boosting the economy of the North. This 
alternative had not been considered at length: and did not entail any major new 
infrastructure other than a package of economic investments in the north. The cabinet 
believed that a high speed rail line was not economically efficient, and were hesitant 
about its environmental impacts. This draft structure vision was published along with 
the existing SEA, and stakeholders and the public were again asked for feedback. 
Public hearings were organized, and hundreds of reactions were received (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat et al, 2006; Projectorganisatie Zuiderzeelijn, 2006).  
Strikingly, millions of Euros had been spent on developing and assessing alternatives 
for a project that had not been selected. Although seemingly wasteful, such efforts 
were necessary to decide if the project would solve any problems, or if it would 
instead create many new problems. Stakeholder respondents indicated that in general, 
they felt that the money had been well-spent. In their eyes, the SEA had contributed 
significantly to the learning process, as had the societal cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Analysis 
Summarizing the main effects of the SEA, it is clear that it contributed in multiple 
ways to the content of the decision-making, the procedure as well as the process.  
 
SEA enables decision-making based upon authoritative information on the 
environmental consequences of a wide range of alternatives (content). 
The SEA was instrumental in bringing about the change of heart with regards to the 
ZZL on its second parliamentary consideration in 2006. The SEA, together with the 
SCBA and the spatial analysis, made it clear that the original problem definition was 
inadequate in that it was based upon the assumption that the distance between the 
economic centre of the Netherlands and the Northern provinces was the reason for the 
economic problems of the latter. Through the assessment procedure it became clear 
that the existing economic structure had to be strengthened. This was controversial 
because many politicians in the Northern provinces were outspoken protagonists of 
the ZZL. However, the argument put forth through the SEA was convincing and it 
strongly influenced the process. Cabinet broadened the official problem definition for 
the study to include the so-called Transition Alternative. 
Respondents of the interviews believed that the SEA assisted in developing 
alternatives that would have been more acceptable for the residents because it elicited 
suggestions from residents well before the authorities had made a decision. 
 
SEA contributes to the quality of the collaborative dialogue and thus to the realization 
of support and legitimacy by achieving consensus (process). 
The SEA process was closely linked to the general planning and assessment process, 
but it also had a separate consultation track. Unlike what is usually done in The 
Netherlands, a number of routing alternatives were developed in rough detail, and 
authorities and residents in the crossed areas were consulted at several stages of the 
plan‟s development. Making use of feedback, and informing people about dilemmas 
at higher scales of planning, the SEA functioned as a generator of alternatives which 
opened new avenues for stakeholders to think about other agendas. Although the rail 
infrastructure proved to be unfeasible in the first phase of the planning process, the 
Northern provinces were asked to consider other ambitions. These were incorporated 
in the Transition Alternative, which was then subject to both the CBA and the SEA 
and was assessed as being much more beneficial.  
The SEA facilitated a process of learning and frame reflection by delivering 
undisputed information about the various benefits and disadvantages of different 
alternatives. The resistance against „unwelcome facts‟ was surprisingly moderate, 
largely because of the transparency and openness of the SEA, the way in which a 
„Critical Review Team‟ safeguarded the quality of the research, and the many 
opportunities for stakeholders to get involved in the research process. 
 
As a procedural device, the SEA contributes to the timeliness, transparency and 
quality of the overall decision-making process (procedure). 
The railway project was one of the first SEAs in the Netherlands that anticipated the 
EU Directive. The project organization used the SEA procedure voluntarily to 
structure stakeholder consultation and to organize the assessment process. Although 
some ministerial officials were skeptical about this instrument, the project 
organization proceeded to use it and emerged very positive about this decision. They 
used it to organize the inherently dynamic information search to answer political 
questions. Although the official requirements of the SEA procedure were minimal, the 
fact that the SEA was attempted created among residents and interest groups high 
expectations of being consulted and considered. Many wondered how seriously their 
input would be considered by the planners and so participated more actively than they 
would normally have.  
The SEA team leader was frequently in communication with the director of the 
project bureau about how to deal with the legal ramifications of the alternatives. The 
SEA had helped to move the planning process safely away from risks created by 
environmental laws by seeking information in a timely manner and by looking for 
alternatives when unexpected impacts emerged in the planning and assessment 
process.  
 
5.2 IJsseldelta South 
High river discharges in 1993 and 1995 caused not only great water damage, but also 
brought about much societal unrest. In response to this, the Dutch central government 
decided that the discharge capacity of the main rivers in the Netherlands had to grow 
such that they could handle Rhine river discharges of 16.000 m
3
/sec at Lobith (near 
the German border).  
This decision had a number of serious implications. A program was set up called 
„Space for the river‟ which had to result in a concrete program of measures to be 
realized before 2015. The capacity of the main rivers in the Netherlands had to be 
substantially enlarged by this time by measures such as groin lowering, dike 
movements and the realization of inundation areas. To strengthen support, these 
measures had to be realized in close interaction with the regional and local authorities 
and had to take into account the agendas of these officials. 
In 2003, the decentralized authorities of the two main river regions sent their preferred 
proposal to the State Secretary of Water Management. Because of a serious bottleneck 
in the river IJssel near the city of Kampen, expansion measures were seen as 
necessary and the widening of the riverbed was seen as a sufficient short term solution 
(2025) to the problem. At the same time, a bypass of the river south of the Vossemeer 
was seen as a necessary long term measure because it was believed that climate 
change would result in even higher river discharge rates. A spatial reservation was 
proposed to forestall other spatial developments in this area and to keep the option of 
an eventual bypass open. In 2003, a parliamentary decision was made on the program 
level in favor of the river widening and the creation of a spatial reservation.  
However, such a spatial reservation was highly undesirable to officials of the 
municipality of Kampen and the province of Overijssel as this area was required to 
meet growing housing needs. They tried to push forward the bypass as the most 
effective measure for the short term, and pointed out that other spatial investments 
were already intended for this area. One of them was a railway called the the 
Hanzeline. Any possible bypass of the river had to cross this Hanzeline twice, and 
would only be possible if a flyover would be part of the route, and if the dimensions 
of a tunnel under the Vossemeer could be adjusted to the bypass.  
The Ministry of Housing and Spatial Planning decided in the spring of 2005 that the 
province of Overijssel had to develop an integral „area development plan‟ which 
included the bypass. 
At this juncture, a very intensive process was begun in which two possible scenarios 
were developed by a small intergovernmental project team with minimal interaction 
with the wider public. This lack of consultation was deemed necessary because it had 
to be cleared and approved by the central government before the end of 2005, or the 
line would be build without these adjustments and the bypass would have become 
prohibitively expensive, if not impossible in the short term.  
The process of scenario building was supplemented by a „voluntary environmental 
assessment‟ in which the project team investigated whether their ideas were 
compatible with the most critical of the environmental objectives formulated by 
European and national directives. Due to the time pressure, the project director opted 
for a limited assessment of several key regulations and the SEA was indefinitely 
postponed.  
The project organization presented five scenarios to its stakeholders and citizens. 
Loud criticism was heard at several informational meetings. To counter the criticism, 
the provincial Deputy invited the citizens to develop their own scenario. Ultimately, 
this grassroots-led scenario was taken up as the Masterplan. 
The Masterplan was elaborated into a formal Intention Agreement between the 
participating authorities before the formal planning process was begun and involved 
the amendment of the provincial and local zoning plans. An SEA was conducted at 
this stage and important questions had to be answered in the SEA in relation to the 
necessity and value of additional housing, the sustainability of the bypass, and the 
viability of alternative development options for the area (Projectorganisatie 
IJsseldelta-Zuid, 2007; 2008).  
The SEA was necessary to fine-tune the details of development plan for the area, and 
to underpin the adjustment of the Provincial Zoning Document. However, as always 
the SEA also fueled a number of new discussions, especially in relation to the way the 
bypass was to be realized. The SEA writers concluded that a „blue bypass‟ with a 
direct connection between river and Vossemeer had the most beneficial consequences 
and the fewest negative external effects (Provincie Overijssel, 2008a; 2008b). 
However, an open, blue bypass was difficult for the Water Board to accept. They were 
anxious about the negative hydrological impacts of the bypass and started contra 
research to support their opinion. In addition, inhabitants and environmental interest 
groups were anxious about the recreational attraction of a blue bypass and the 
negative consequences of this for the environment.  
The results of the SEA with regard to future population growth were also subject to 
much debate. Some environmental stakeholders and inhabitant associations criticized 
the assumptions behind these scenarios. Although the governments involved adjusted 
their plans for the number and location of the houses to be built, much discontent 
remained because the contrary views and expert opinions gathered by the stakeholder 
groups were not authoritatively refuted. 
 
Analysis 
 
The SEA enables decision-making based upon authoritative knowledge of the 
environmental consequences of a wide range of possible alternatives (content). 
The SEA for the amendment of the Provincial Zoning Plan to enable project 
IJsseldelta South was very helpful in framing the reconsideration of the Masterplan 
which was initially seen as the preferred alternative. The question on the table was 
whether a green or a blue bypass would be the better option and key insights from the 
SEA caused both the provincial and the municipal governments to rethink the value of 
a blue bypass.  The assessment of different variants allowed for the selection of the 
option with the most beneficial consequences that added the greatest value to the 
development of the area as a whole.  
Another important insight arising out of the SEA pertained to the unwanted 
environmental effects of housing beyond the dikes of the bypass. However this factor 
was neglected because of strong political pressure to realize an attractive housing 
environment.  
Although indeed beneficial, the timing of the SEA did not allow it to contribute 
meaningfully to the quality of the overall decision to reallocate the whole area. In the 
eyes of the involved local and regional government, it helped only to optimize the 
final planning decision.  
 
SEA contributes to the quality of the collaborative dialogue and achieves consensus in 
the support and legitimacy of the final option (process). 
The SEA did not serve to create an inclusive collaborative process. On the contrary, 
the SEA functioned as a source of controversy in that it both fueled the existing 
debate and initiated new ones. Stakeholders were not satisfied with the way they were 
involved in the knowledge production process, and some outcomes, for example, 
about the shape of the bypass and housing development outside the dikes only 
encouraged further polarized debate.  
The way in which the SEA was carried out (with close cooperation between the 
project organization and the research institute DHV) can be blamed for much of this 
failure. The amount of interaction and reflection that was facilitated within the project 
group (which included the various public stakeholders), and within the soundboard 
group (in which other stakeholder groups came together) was insufficient to facilitate 
a process of frame reflection and joint learning.  
A serious discussion about the added value of the bypass was never held, and this 
constituted an important omission in the planning process was. The spatial reservation 
of the area of South Kampen caused the provincial government to decide to speed-up 
a decision about a bypass without securing enough evidence for its necessity. Its value 
was explained with reference to the extreme river discharges warned of by Dutch 
water management authority. The SEA failed to convince all actors because a debate 
about the added value was lacking. 
 
SEA as a procedural device contributes to the timeliness, transparency and quality of 
the overall decision-making process (procedure).   
The formal procedure of the SEA was used as an argument to postpone environmental 
assessment to a latter phase of the process. Another argument for this decision was the 
formal status of the Masterplan. This was no formal plan, and therefore no formal 
SEA was required. Only the next step in the process which was to make a regional 
planning decision required an official SEA.  
Whether the SEA was helpful in organizing the provincial planning procedure is 
ambiguous. The formulation of the SEA was mainly an internal matter involving the 
researchers and the project team. The project manager was highly involved in 
coupling the outcomes of the SEA to the planning process. The process of adjusting 
the regional planning document led the progress, and the SEA procedure followed the 
planning procedure in this regard. The same was true of stakeholder involvement 
which was organized within the framework of changing the planning document. This 
arrangement was also used to discuss the research questions, preliminary results and 
the final SEA report.  
Nevertheless, the SEA was certainly helpful in investigating the negative 
environmental impacts of the bypass and in designing the adjustments necessary to 
mitigate these consequences. The SEA revealed that some important habitat types 
were significantly influenced by the bypass and thus helped to prevent future delays in 
the form of legal action on the part of environmental groups. 
 6. Case comparison 
In both cases, the SEA had an important role in the decision-making process. 
However, there also are clear differences. Table 1 compares the case studies on a 
number of crucial factors. 
 
 Southern Sea Line Kampen IJsseldelta 
Timing of SEA Parallel to the discussion about 
necessity and added value of the 
ZZL 
In the phase from Intention 
Agreement to Provincial zoning plan  
Scope Fundamental discussion about ZZL, 
yes or no 
Applied discussion about how to 
shape the bypass 
Organization 
of SEA 
In a very open consultation process 
with stakeholders 
Mainly between experts and project 
group 
Quality checks  NCEA, Critical Review Team NCEA, contra expertise Water 
Board 
Coupling with 
other tracks 
Strong coupling with the CBA, 
spatial analysis and the Zoning Plan 
Strong coupling with the 
development of the Preferred 
Alternative and the adjustment of the 
regional and local planning 
document 
Flexibility of 
scope 
Used to incorporate new ideas. The 
political decision-makers adjusted 
their assignment of the project 
Not used: SEA was meant to fill in 
the necessary knowledge 
requirements 
Contribution 
to process 
Guiding for intensive consultation 
process with stakeholders and 
citizens 
One of items that fueled the debate 
in the stakeholder process   
Contribution 
to procedure 
Guiding in structuring the whole 
process with regard to the Structure 
Plan 
Servant in structuring one specific 
phase in the process, the provincial 
zoning plan 
Contribution 
to content 
Building block for abandoning ZZL 
and raising alternatives 
Building block for political 
preference for blue bypass 
 
The most important differences between the cases lie in the way in which the SEA 
was embedded in the decision-making process and when it was executed. Compared 
to the SEA of the Southern Sea Line, the SEA of the IJsseldelta project was executed 
during a more leisurely phase. The most crucial period of this project was when the 
Masterplan was drawn, and this had already passed by the time the SEA was initiated. 
The SEA in this case was carried out purely to support the formal planning procedure, 
and to change the provincial zoning plan. This made this SEA much less exciting 
compared to the SEA in the ZZL, which was carried out in parallel with the 
discussion on the necessity of the whole project.  
The ZZL case shows us that an SEA can be used to structure stakeholder involvement 
in such a way that it also contributes to a process of frame reflection and learning. The 
formal steps of the SEA were combined with the formal steps necessary to design a 
Structure Vision. In the case of the IJseeldelta project, perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
timing of the SEA‟s implementation caused some earlier debates to be repeated and 
new debates to be started. The individuals overseeing the SEA process found it 
difficult to handle this situation, as several crucial decisions had already been made by 
the time they were involved and they lacked the authority to offer stakeholders a real 
say.  
An interesting similarity between the cases was the interweaving of the development 
of the planning document (zoning plan) and the execution of the SEA. Although the 
planning phases differed, the ways in which the SEA helped to optimize the final 
planning decisions were highly comparable. We can say that both SEAs helped to 
improve the search for the most feasible and valuable alternative since both the 
planning process and the research process were intertwined and carried out 
simultaneously. 
Using our definition of effectiveness, we can conclude that the SEA for the ZZL was 
more effective than the SEA for the IJsseldelta project. First, it was used to organize a 
serious debate about the necessity and value of the entire project, instead of merely 
fine-tuning a pre-selected alternative (as was the case in the IJsseldelta). Second, 
because large investments were made in combining the stakeholder participation 
process with the research process, the SEA contributed heavily to frame reflection. It 
did not simply serve as added fuel for existing controversies not directly addressed by 
the SEA. Third, in the case of the ZZL, the SEA procedure was used to organize the 
entire exploration process. In contrast, the SEA in the IJsseldelta case was merely a 
small player in the procedures put in place to adjust the provincial zoning plan. 
Because it was introduced very late in the decision making process, this SEA could 
not be used to generate viable alternatives or introduce radically new perspectives into 
the decision process.  
Further, the difference in the way in which the SEA was organized in the two cases 
was critical.  In the ZZL case, the production of the SEA was intertwined with other 
project organization activities. The SEA experts belonged to the core of the project 
bureau, and were important for developing an explicit strategy for organizing the 
collaborative process and linking it to larger political decision-making processes. The 
SEA focused on the groups that were affected because of their location near the 
possible railway routes, and included the impact on them both in the general cost 
benefit analysis, and the generation of alternative proposals. As doubts grew about the 
feasibility of the line, the SEA focused increasingly on other alternatives. It co-created 
the alternatives, while respecting and following the main process. In the case of 
IJsseldelta Zuid, the SEA team was far more distant from the main project team, and 
the link between the project and the SEA was restricted mainly to the relationship 
between the project director and the SEA project leader. For these reasons, the SEA in 
this case could be seen more as a passive information provision tool, with far less 
influence on the decision-making process.  
 
7.  Conclusion and discussion 
We have analyzed two cases involving the application of SEAs to strategic decisions 
about highly controversial infrastructure projects. These findings are not entirely 
novel, and reflect many of the findings in previous works related to assessment 
effectiveness (Thérivel & Minas, 2002; Sheate et al. 2003). In both cases, the 
effectiveness of the SEA was highly dependent on the time of its commissioning, the 
degree to which it was intertwined with the decision-making process, and the 
openness of its application. The most visible beneficial effects of the SEA were 
observed in the ZZL case, where the SEA was instrumental in activating affected 
groups. Their input was subsequently used to adjust the planning process. The SEA 
team worked closely with the general planning team and this close cooperation 
allowed environmental information to influence the general planning process. As a 
result, different alternatives emerged which then were also subject to other 
assessments. This case demonstrates that the process of conducting an SEA can play a 
much greater role in determining its ultimate impact than the specific content it 
generates. The potential of the SEA to create collaborative dialogue and to establish a 
functional procedure is immense and can exert a strong influence on the quality of the 
final decision. 
The fact that the SEA was initiated early in the discussion on necessity and added 
value made it far more effective than it was in the IJsseldelta case. The role of timing 
is indicative of the value of the SEA establishment procedure in structuring and 
framing the overall planning process and the collaborative dialogue that surrounds it. 
When the SEA process is adopted midstream (as was the case in IJsseldelta) it cannot 
serve this structuring function. The project would have developed its own structure 
and process arrangements, and would not be amenable to the introduction of new 
procedures. In the ZZL case, the project had to be organized from scratch, and the 
SEA procedure was gratefully embraced as a means of framing the process. This 
served to embed the SEA far more deeply into the decision-making process, which 
served as an important factor in its ultimate success. This finding mirrors that of 
Runhaar & Driessen (2007) who similarly argued that the „synchronization‟ of SEA 
and the planning process are critical factors that determine the impact of an SEA.  
In conclusion, the contribution of an SEA to the procedural quality of the urban 
planning decision-making process can differ dramatically from case to case. The SEA 
procedure can be used to structure the larger process, but it can also function as a 
subordinate procedure with minimal visible structuring impact. More detailed 
research is necessary to investigate the mechanisms by which SEA makes its 
procedural contribution to the decision-making processes (see Fischer, 2002).  
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